Prepared for the CEPS/IISS European Security Forum, Brussels, 12 May 2003
The aim of this chapter is to analyze the debate surrounding Turkey's increasing strategic importance in the wake of September 11 terror attacks on Washington and New York. Traditionally, Turkey has been considered an important country because of its geographic location between Europe, the Middle East and Asia, which gives it easy access to strategically important regions and major energy resources. Moreover, thanks to its character as a modern Muslim country, culturally, Turkey stands as a bridge between Western and Islamic civilizations. The conventional importance attributed to Turkey's strategic value became more visible following the events of September 11, and consequently Turkey has come under the spotlight. As a result, Turkey and Turkish foreign policy started to receive a great interest, and the mood in the discussions about Turkey and Turkey's strategic importance was usually optimistic. However, the discourse was mainly ahistoric, temporal and isolated from reality, and the focus was very narrow. Therefore it was often lost in the debate that, seen in a wider perspective, there are a number of other factors to be taken into account, which indicate that a more cautious and balanced approach is necessary. In this sense, the tone in this article will be rather critical and skeptical. What we are going to do is, first, to briefly summarize the central arguments which are used to emphasize an enhanced strategic role for Turkey in the new era. After each argument, we will try to approach this argument critically and underline the inconsistencies and shortcomings of the argument under consideration. The chapter concludes with an attempt to develop a more balanced interpretation of the effect of post-September 11 developments on Turkish foreign policy.
The first effect of September 11 which can be said to have contributed to Turkey's position was alleged growing acceptance towards the Turkish approach to the fight against terrorism in international relations. Turkey itself had long struggled against separatist terror and political Islam in domestic context. Since the 1970s, Turkey has been engaged in fighting against terrorism and continues to be one of the major targets of terrorist activities, both at home and abroad. Turkey's first encounter with international terrorism was political assassinations carried out by ASALA (Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia) against Turkish diplomats abroad in the 1970s. During the last two decades, particularly the Kurdish issue and the terrorist activities of PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) involved cross-border aspects and became of international concern.[1] Therefore, one part of the Turkish strategy to deal with this problem was to seek international cooperation in fighting against terrorism. In this regard, successive Turkish governments endeavored to generate an international concern against terrorism. In particular, they worked hard to convince European countries to limit the activities of various separatist, leftist and Islamist organizations. As part of its activities, Turkey even tried on some occasions to bring the terror issue onto NATO's agenda.[2]
Besides trying to raise the terror issue in several political and diplomatic fora, Turkey did not hesitate to resorting to the military instruments as well. To meet the rising challenge of separatist terror in South Eastern Anatolian region, Turkey employed a stubborn, and at times harsh, policy based on heavy reliance on military measures in order to, first stop the terror activities carried out by the PKK, and then root out the formation of terrorist groups and their support bases. In a similar vein, emphasis on the use or threat of force outside its borders as part of the fight against terrorism was a logical correlation of this policy. Numerous instances of Turkish incursions into northern Iraq are cases in point. The authority vacuum emerged after the imposition of no-fly zone in the Northern Iraq enabled PKK to use the region as a rear base to conduct terrorist attacks inside Turkish territory. Based on a somewhat complicated mixture of the notion of 'hot pursuit' and an expanded interpretation of the norm of self-defense, Turkish armed forces were dispatched into Northern Iraq to destroy PKK guerillas and training camps or prevent PKK from planning and executing subversive attacks on Turkish soil. While some of those operations were limited in scope, some were large-scale involving thousands of troops – at times Turkish soldiers crossing the border reached 35.000 –, backed by tanks, artillery, and helicopters.
The relations with Syria as far as its support to PKK terrorism is concerned is another case in which Turkey resorted to essentially military means. By mid-1998, the PKK came to maintain its existence almost entirely on Syrian support; Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK's leader, had been given a sanctuary by the Syrian government, and Syrian territory was a safe route for PKK militants in their journey between PKK training camps in Lebanon's Syrian-controlled Bekaa valley and the Turkish border. Indeed, during the Turkish Syrian crisis of October 1998 Turkey used a coercive diplomacy backed up by a credible threat of force against the Syrian regime to end its support to PKK and give up providing shelter to Ocalan. It is worth noting that, in the meantime, Turkey had already strengthened its military ties with Israel to exert pressure on Syria from the south. Turkey's threat of force accompanied by military maneuvers undertaken close to the Syrian border bore fruits; faced with overwhelming power of Turkish military Syrian government complied to Turkish demands and had asked Ocalan and the PKK to leave the country which constituted the first step in a chain of events that led to the capture of Ocalan in Kenya. Following their expulsion from Syria, PKK forces relocated to northern Iraq, yet, a subsequent Turkish incursion into the region dealt a severe blow to their military capabilities, and the PKK collapsed militarily.[3]
As a matter of fact, Turkish activities to this end, be it diplomatic or military, were hardly welcomed by its neighbors, nor by its Western partners; as a result, Turkey could not raise the necessary international support in its own fight against terrorism. To the contrary, these issues have constantly been a point of tension and disagreement in Turkish foreign policy throughout the 1990s and Turkey came under severe international criticism. Assertive Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East region added to the already troubled relations with the Arab neighbors. Likewise, it was in this context that from time to time Turkey's relations with its Western partners deteriorated due to the problems stemming from Turkey's struggle with terrorism, and that issue has been a major impediment to Turkey's will for a closer integration into the European Union. In particular, the charge that Turkey's approach to the issue of terrorism and the way Turkey tackles with this problem was a major source of human rights violations and the limitations of individual rights and liberties at home was often raised against the country at several international platforms. Therefore Turkey was always under a European pressure to undertake domestic reforms to ameliorate the situation. As far as foreign policy is concerned, with its principally military-oriented security strategy, in stark contrast to 'civilian' European approach, Turkey's assertiveness in the region was seen as an indication that Turkey was a 'security consuming' or 'insecurity provider' to the European security, thus an actor to be treated with a certain reservation.[4]
Against this background, it is obvious that Turkey was one of the main beneficiaries of the new international atmosphere. At last, the phenomenon of terrorism and the threat of terrorist activities were formally recognized as an international concern and an international consensus on the issue seemed to be emerging. The challenge posed by terrorism to international security was considered so acute that it was even enough a justification for the North Atlantic Council to invoke NATO's Article 5, for the first time ever. From the United Nations to the OSCE, several other international and regional organizations captured the prevailing mood and adapted similar revolutionary resolutions or decisions to express their willingness to respond to the perils of terror on international level. It did not take so long that the Turkish side grasped this opportunity; thus the president, the prime minister, the foreign minister and other officials representing the country gave their full and unqualified support to those international initiatives.[5] This was in fact more than an expression of international solidarity with the U.S. and the victims of those startling attacks. Beyond that, there was a golden, god-given opportunity for Turkey to utilize. Turkish elites and intellectuals just did this, by, after reminding in each declaration or speech that Turkey itself had suffered from terrorism, repeatedly emphasizing that the events of September 11 proved the validity of Turkish arguments. They went on by expressing their hope that Turkey's European partners would also realize their past mistakes in criticizing Turkey, and eventually readjust their policies vis-à-vis Turkey in the face of the new realities out there proving Turkey's rightfulness: President Ahmet Necdet Sezer was maintaining that those attacks should be a lesson for the European countries and was calling for a change in their attitude and state of mind towards terrorism. After pointing out that terrorism was a crime committed against all humanity, he went on saying, "that's why we have always repeated in all international platforms that international cooperation in the fight against terrorism should be improved. The attacks on the US has shown how correct Turkey is in her stance against terrorism. I guess the attitudes of European countries have begun to change too."[6] This was so because, in Turkish view, the European countries misinterpreted the balance between the concepts of human rights and terrorism, a point emphasized by a senior Turkish Foreign Ministry official: "The United States was very well aware of the concerns raised by Turkey regarding terrorism. However, the Europeans did not understand this and the concept of human rights was raised by our European colleagues when we made references to terrorism at international gatherings. And now, it is clearly seen that a balance between the concepts of terrorism and human rights is necessary."[7]
Moreover, in a similar line, Turkey paid a special attention to stress that terrorism is a global issue and thus must be fought globally. This point was also repeatedly emphasized by the government officials, as well as columnists and civil society organizations. Foreign Minister Ismail Cem, in his address at the Organization of Islamic Countries Summit was referring to the same point: "Terrorism does not have geography, it is the same terrorism, which manifests itself in several countries, in the West and in the East, in all geographies, all over the world... Therefore, terrorism is a global phenomenon that crosses borders and the fight against it requires effective international cooperation."[8] In this sense, NATO's decision to invoke Article 5 was a welcome development for Turkey, as expressed by Ambassador Onur Öymen, Turkey's Permanent Representative to NATO: "We have always called for terrorist activities to be included within the Article 5... we have always stated that an attack does not only mean a country's intrusion to another country's territory but it also covers terrorist attacks which is an international problem. That's why NATO's invoking of Article 5 is very important for us."[9]
Furthermore, some Turkish analysts did not even hesitate to announce the advent of a "global February 28."[10] While challenging the rise of political Islam, the particular conditions and characteristics of Turkey were used as a justification to limit the individual rights and democratic freedoms by the secular elites, backed by the powerful military, during the 28 February process. In a similar vein, it was argued that the U.S. and Western countries may embark on a similar policy at a global scale so as to wipe out several international networks, irrespective of whether they are moderate or radical, which were supposedly behind the terror attacks of September 11. As part of this new strategy, in particular, the U.S. would be less willing to criticize non-democratic practices in the Islamic world for the sake of assuring their cooperation in the global war against terrorism. That could, the argument goes on, in return hint at the emergence of a new "precedent" justifying the Turkish way of dealing with terrorism, and in effect, relieving Turkey of some of the external pressures it had encountered in the past.
The first observation about these arguments is that they were, to a large extent, self-propaganda. It was not possible to hear, from outside, a corresponding appreciation of the Turkish theses, except perhaps some American commentators.[11] To name one, Radu was a very vocal supporter of Turkish position on that matter. He argues that "Europeans, at least before September 11, were playing games in the name of 'human rights' – particularly for terrorists, who were protected at home and even against the vital security of non-EU countries... Let us hope that once the US and Turkey, to mention just two cases, are finally seen as equally victimised, the EU response will be similar... That revision also includes a new look at Turkey's anti-PKK and anti-Islamist policy – not as anti-democratic, but as protective of the Muslim world's only truly secular democracy."[12] The optimistic mood and Turkish discourse, therefore, largely remained wishful thinking.
The main problem with this argument was that Turks chose to interpret these developments in such a way that this new 'precedent' justified whatever Turkey did in the past to fight against separatism and political Islam, a point very well illustrated by Ismail Cem: "For years, Turkey has kept on explaining to the international community what terrorism is, the consequences of it, the importance and the need for international cooperation in struggling against it, and have kept on making proposals at international platforms methods of a collective struggle against terrorism. September 11 has proved how right Turkey's sensitivity on this issue was. What everyone is trying to do collectively today is no different to that which Turkey has strived to achieve for years."[13]
However, it is unlikely that the Turkish arguments will be entirely accepted by the West in general and Europeans in particular, without any reservations. For instance, if we take Turkey's warm welcome to NATO's activation of Article 5, one has to bear in mind the particular conditions in which NATO took that decision, and the unique position of the U.S. in shaping decisions in NATO; thus its value as an almost automatic precedent remains an open question. Even if one accepts that Article 5 could be activated against terror attacks, what is less clear is whether it will be applicable to the threats or attacks coming from an organization established in one's own country. Last but not least, when the time comes to the implementation of Article 5, there might be possibly divergences over identifying the concrete source of terror threat, or how to respond to that particular threat.[14]
Another limitation to Turkey's optimism is exerted by differing views on terrorism. Particularly in regards to the Kurdish issue, broadly speaking, the European view is that it cannot be simply confined to fighting against terrorism. Although official Turkish discourse preferred to view the Kurdish issue as originating from socioeconomic conditions of the southeastern Anatolia, and aggravated by the problems posed by terrorism that is largely aroused by outside support of those trying to undermine Turkey, in European eyes, it is rather very much related to political and cultural rights and democratization.[15] Thus, the well-known analogy: one's terrorist might be independent fighter in others' eyes. And there is reason to expect that this will remain the case, despite Turkish initial optimism to the contrary.[16] Moreover, large Kurdish populations in Europe are acting as a strong pressure group and limiting the maneuverability of Western governments. As it is claimed rightly, Kurdish issue has also been a European one for it affects the Turkish and Kurdish migrants living in Europe, and the host countries.[17] Furthermore, there is a fundamental difference between the EU and Turkey in regards to the problem of terrorism. Even if one accepts the reality of terrorism, the ways to tackle this problem are differently perceived. The Turkish approach is closer to the United States than the EU.[18] As we observe, the EU and the United States have been differing on many issues, including the question of how to identify the causes and sources of terrorism as well as the means to be used in fighting against it. The EU has stressed the importance of preventive measures and prioritizing the political and economic instruments, and has questioned the effectiveness of punitive military measures. Considering that the Europeans were even critical of the United States, expecting that they would welcome Turkish activities without any reservations is hardly tenable.[19]
Therefore it is hard to be very optimistic and expect a major breakthrough that would bring about a substantial shift in Western responses to Turkey's approach to combating terrorism.[20] Moreover, Turkey's hope that the new emerging consensus on terrorism will relieve it of European pressures on the Kurdish issue is difficult to sustain. The Europeans would resist subsuming this wider problem under the rubric of terror and maintain their demands from Turkey to continue with the necessary domestic reforms in political and cultural aspects of the issue, even after the September 11. Thus, Kurdish issue will not cease as one of the hurdles Turkey has to face in its journey towards the European Union. The discussion about the list of terrorist organizations prepared by the EU within the context of forging an international coalition against the sources of terrorism was illustrative of this point, and one can expect similar differences in the future as well. The story developed as follows:
Turkey has started an intensive diplomatic initiative in the wake of the September 11 attacks to utilize the international environment to convince EU members to include 10 Turkish organizations on its list of terrorist organizations. The inclusion of an organization on the list means that its assets will be frozen, its offices closed and its activities traced. However, this may not automatically translate into the extradition of its members to their country of origin, particularly if the country is not an EU member and still practices the death penalty. Despite Turkey's efforts, the EU included none of the terrorist organizations on its list, which was declared on December 27, 2001. Especially the exclusion of the armed militant groups from the first version of the list, such as the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C), which are active in some European countries under different banners, drew Turkish reaction and that problem remained on the agenda for some time.[21] Turkish diplomacy and lobbying worked; thus, on May 2, 2002 the two organizations were finally added to the modified EU list. This decision was seen by many as a Turkish victory.[22] Yet, to see the effectiveness of these measures, one has to wait and take into consideration a couple of other factors.
First, in the meantime, the PKK announced in April that it would cease all activities and regroup under a new name, the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK).[23] KADEK said it was ending its armed struggle to campaign peacefully for greater rights for Kurds in southeastern Turkey, but without disbanding its armed wing. The Turkish government has termed the name-change meaningless.[24] Yet, in spite of Turkey's demands, KADEK is not included on the EU list. The EU countries prefer to wait to be able to judge whether to include KADEK as well.
Second, these EU norms need to be transformed into national legal orders, and in some of the EU member states, the national legal norms are not enough to effectively limit the activities of these terrorist organizations, and this point has been utilized by the operatives of those organizations. This is especially true as far as Belgium is concerned.[25] Third, most of these organizations have been active in Europe for decades and they know the ways to circumvent such legal barriers. For instance, a spokesman for the DHKP-C has claimed that these decisions will not substantially affect their activities.[26] What the EU member states can do, is to freeze their bank accounts, but they have no money in banks. The same source further claimed that the name DHKP-C is on the EU list, but that the registered name of their organization is the DHKP and DHKC, and mentioning the fact that they have been working in the United Kingdom for many years, although the DHKP-C was outlawed there. They may have some more ways to find loopholes in legal norms as well. Therefore, Turkey still has to work hard in order to ensure the effectiveness of this initiative.
The second development regarding Turkey's growing strategic importance was the increasing reference to Turkey as a model for the Islamic world. The war against the Taliban and the al-Qaeda was, in a political and intellectual sense, also a war against a militant, reactive, anti-Western, or anti-American, interpretation of Islam. The protests against American operations and support for bin-Laden in some parts of the Islamic world created fears that the developments might lead to a so-called "clash of civilizations," or a "Christian-Muslim confrontation." Therefore, the American administration strived to use every opportunity to prevent such a negative interpretation of the American role and to deliver a message that this was not a war against Islam. As a concrete proof of this policy, the inclusion of certain Muslim countries into the international coalition appeared to be necessary, especially when it later came to using force in Afghanistan.[27] Within this light, Turkey emerged as a valuable asset for American policy.
No doubt, Turkey offered all assistance in its capability to the international coalition from the very beginning, through allowing the use of its territory and air space for logistical support, or through its contribution to international peacekeeping force in Afghanistan. But, this was more than a practical military/strategic contribution in the long-term war against the forces of terrorism and fanaticism. Hence, the fact that Turkey is the only Muslim country with a secular system of governance, which is also member of NATO and other European institutions, was repeatedly expressed not only by the Turkish policy makers themselves, but also by the international observers, and U.S. officials. As such, as the argument goes, Turkey would be a perfect role model for the Islamic world. The 21st conference of the American-Turkish Council (ATC) held in Washington in March 2002 was an important venue where those arguments were often heart. A few days before the conference, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz was underlying that supporting moderate Muslims who abhor terrorism and extremism was a key to winning the war on terrorism. "To win that war against terrorism, we have to reach out to the hundreds of millions of Muslims who believe in tolerance and moderation... By helping them to stand up against terrorists, we help ourselves." Therefore, the anti-terrorism campaign was not just a military fight but also "a battle for hearts and minds as well"; and within this context Turkey, "can be an example for the Muslim world" of a country that reconciles Islam with liberal democracy.[28] According to US President George W. Bush, Turkey was a hope-provoking alternative against radicalism and religious intolerance. In his message sent to the ATC conference, he stressed that Turkey with its Muslim beliefs and its embracing of the democracy ideals of Atatürk set an example.[29] In his address at the conference, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Marc Grossman was also underlying that one of the few things that had not changed after September 11 was: "Turkey is once again highlighted as a model for those countries with an Islamic heritage who choose to be -and work to be- modern, secular, democratic, and true to their faith simultaneously. Those of us who have admired Turkey for this vision for years now find we are not so alone in wishing that your great endeavor succeeds".[30]
However, the very fact that the terrorist activities were undertaken by an organization, justifying its actions by reference to Islam, was a serious moral challenge many Muslim countries had to respond.[31] There was a considerable effort on the part of the statesmen and intellectuals in the Islamic world to stave off linking terror in general, and September 11 terror attacks in particular to Islam and Islamic groups. Perhaps, nowhere was this concern more visible than in Turkey, a country which, while orienting itself towards Western norms and values, at the same time maintained its ties with Islam and Islamic world. Indeed, it was this duality that put enormous pressure on Turkey to call the world to draw a distinction between Islam and terror. Turkish political leaders and intellectuals, like their counterparts in other Islamic countries, took pains to emphasize that Islam was a religion of peace and a distinction between Islam and terrorism must be drawn. While the Prime Minister was calling equating Islam with terror unjust,[32] the Foreign Minister was saying: "terrorism does not have a religion, geography and there can be no justification for terrorism under any circumstances... To identify terrorism with any religion is an insult to all religions. We strongly condemn those who have used the name of our holy religion to define some terrorists. Following the tragedy in the USA, Turkey conferred with some fellow members of the OIC and urged her NATO allies as well as the EU members to avoid such misuse."[33]
In this regards, the OIC-EU Summit, which was held in Istanbul in 12-13 February, was an expression of Turkey's determination to assume its responsibility through a policy of bridging the East and the West, and calling for harmony, rather than conflict between two civilizations. The Forum turned out to be a useful platform for an intensive exchange of views between representatives of international organizations, high-ranking politicians, opinion-makers, intellectuals from EU-member countries, OIC-member countries and observer countries, and mutual compliments filled the air although it remains to be seen what it will bring about in concrete political terms.[34] Nevertheless, organizing such a conference, and bringing together EU member states and Muslim countries around the same table had a symbolic meaning and it was seen as the start of the new Turkish role.[35] Ismail Cem's views on the conference were reflective of this: "An example of what Turkey could do [to play a bridging role between the Islamic World and the Western Christian World] can be seen in the forthcoming meeting of the OIC and the EU. For the first time these two organizations will be coming together for a political exchange of opinions. Besides, in the aftermath of September 11 we are strongly opposed to the wrong perception of placing terrorism and Islam side by side. I had spoken with many of my Western colleagues and drew their attention to the sensitivity of wording used... In correcting such mistakes and in establishing some sort of a harmony, Turkey has a pioneering place that is provided to it by its history, culture and modern identity. We have to act in awareness of that responsibility".[36]
This argument, to conclude, implied at least two interrelated aspects: First, Turkey's support for the coalition was instrumental in defusing the charge that the war was a Muslim-Christian confrontation.[37] This point was very well expressed by Foreign Minister Cem: "This is the fight between democracy and terrorism and the struggle between the wise and fanatic. We believe that this fight will be won by our side. Turkey will be the biggest obstacle before those who want to divert this fact to a wrong path such as a fight between the religions".[38] Second, the Turkish model was offered as an alternative to a Taliban version of Islam. That means, Islam and modern values are compatible with each other, and it is possible to reconcile Islam within a modern, Western-style, democratic and secular system. In the words of Dale F. Eickelman, "Turkey can only offer the world an example of a nation in which Western democratic values and Islam converge in an increasingly strengthened civil society in which the state and religion are not seen as adversaries. 'Western' societies, like 'Islamic' ones, have no place for either militant secular extremism or militant religious extremism".[39] In practical terms, Turkey's taking part in the Western-led coalition was expected to facilitate other countries' adapting counter-terrorist stance and cooperation with the US.[40] Seen from another perspective, it was also argued that this "geo-cultural" dimension, in addition to the geopolitical position, could constitute another asset for Turkey in its relations with Western world, particularly as far as its quest for becoming a full member of the European Union concerns.[41]
Yet the argument that Turkey could be a role model for Islamic world is also controversial in some aspects. First, Turkish ambitions in this direction are not new and we have enough evidence to judge how they are perceived in other parts of the Islamic world. Turks themselves are proud of being the only secular country in the Islamic world; and from time to time, Turkey is offered as a role model from the outside as well. Yet, it is also equally true that Turkey's perception of itself as a model could not go beyond being an illusion, and those Western ideas promoted by Turkey have hardly penetrated into other Muslim societies. Arab countries' criticism of the secular Turkish model, and other problems dominating Turkish-Arab relations are no secret. In this sense, any fundamental shift in the perceptions of other Muslim societies, which would ease the objections to adapting a Turkish style system, cannot be observed. To the contrary, considering the growing anti-American feelings it is hard to expect that such a role for Turkey would be welcomed. Moreover, American way of dealing with terror through primarily military means or through supporting the existing non-democratic regimes in the Islamic world may hinder the burgeoning reformist movements in those countries and set fallbacks to the natural transformation of those societies, with a result that radicalism in the Islamic world could be given a new impetus. In this sense, Turkey's attempts to carry the Western values into the region might even widen the existing gap between Turkey and other Islamic societies.
Second, the main problem with this argument is the question of whether it is possible at all to transform a society from the outside. As long as domestic enthusiasm for reform is lacking, the international pressures or influences to change a society's nature, structure, laws, and political, economic and social cultures to make them conform with certain models have limited effect. To be able to influence a society from outside, international actors must have strong linkages, which would enable them to exert pressures stimulating a change in the behavior of the domestic actors. For instance, if we remember Turkish-EU relations, despite the existence of strong linkages, there is still a resistance to change coming from the Turkish establishment. Considering the lack of linkages, societal differences and geographical distances between Turkey and other Muslim societies, prospects for Turkey's influencing other Muslim countries remain limited. Likewise, democratic regimes and other practices cannot be established overnight, nor can they be taken granted. It took Turkey decades to reach its current level, and this was no doubt a painful process. That also dictates against transplanting Turkey's experience into other societies, which have not followed a similar path. On the other hand, even if one assumes that Islamic world wants and needs change, there is nothing to suggest that that would be one imposed from Washington with its own political agenda.
Let us move to the third area where Turkey's influence is supposedly growing, and a similar Turkish role is expected. The war against Afghanistan and terrorism brought the Central Asian, Caspian and Caucasus regions once again into the locus of interest. Some countries in the region, which are mostly ruled by former Communist leaders in an authoritarian manner, were also under pressure from domestic opposition. Since this opposition was mixed with some elements of Islamic radicalism, particularly in the case of Central Asian states, such as Uzbekistan, the regimes became active supporters of the international coalition against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Moreover, the prospect of American involvement in the region offered a good chance to those countries for balancing the Russian dominance through assuring American backing. Consequently, they did not hesitate to respond to American demands and they provided the United States with access to their air space and military bases.[42] U.S. willingness to widen the international coalition against terrorism diminished concerns for human rights and democratization, and resulted in a situation where human rights violations and anti-democratic practices by the governments in the region might be overlooked. Once being an impediment to more proactive U.S. engagement in the region, disappearance of human rights considerations in effect facilitated the U.S. cooperation with the Central Asian countries.
In developing this relationship, Turkey's special ties with the region again appeared to be an important asset for U.S. policy. Turkey had a lot to offer: Not only did Turkey have strong political, cultural and economic connections to the region, but it had also accumulated a significant intelligence capability in the region. Moreover, the large experience Turkey accumulated in fighting terrorism would be made available in expanding the global war on terrorism to this region.[43] As a result, after the locus of interest shifted to a possible operation against Afghanistan, and then to assuring the collaboration of the countries in Central Asia, Turkish analysts soon discovered that Turkey's geo-strategic importance was once again on the rise. It was thought that, thanks to its geography's allowing easy access to the region, and its strong ties with the countries there, Turkey could play a pivotal role in the conduct of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, and reshaping the politics in Central Asia: "Turkey is situated in a critical geographic position on and around which continuous and multidimensional power struggles with a potential to affect balance of power at world scale take place. The arcs that could be used by world powers in all sort of conflicts pass through Turkey. Turkish territory, airspace and seas are not only a necessary element to any force projection in the regions stretching from Europe and Asia to the Middle East, Persian Gulf, and Africa, but also make it possible to control its neighborhood... All these features made Turkey a center that must be controlled and acquired by those aspiring to be world powers... In the new process, Turkey's importance has increased in American calculations. With a consistent policy, Turkey could capitalize on this to derive some practical benefits... Turkey has acquired a new opportunity to enhance its role in Central Asia."[44]
Growing international interest in the region had further implications on the energy resources in the Caspian basin and Central Asia. Already before the September 11 events, there had been much talk about a new 'great game' in the making on the chessboard of Central Asia and Caucasus.[45] After the war in Afghanistan, there was a growing belief among many analysts that the centuries-old great game was entering a new phase.[46] According to this line of reasoning, the US military operations in Afghanistan were not simply a response to the attacks of September 11. Rather, "the plans for the American offensive in Afghanistan were not formulated in response to September 11, but existed prior to the terrorist attacks in the USA. Therefore, it could be argued that the attacks on September 11 provided the US with the opportunity to enter Afghanistan to further extend a project that had already started months, if not years, earlier."[47] This was attributed to the special geostrategic significance of Afghanistan. Because, "Afghanistan occupies a strategic position in the geopolitical landscapes in general, and the geopolitics of the oil and natural gas resources in particular. Afghanistan has been in an extremely significant location spanning South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East... the US administration has significant political/ military and economic reasons to try to turn Afghanistan into a base for American military operations in the region. There can be no doubting Afghanistan's strategic importance to the US."[48] Even one analyst goes as far as claiming that "The hidden stakes in the war against terrorism can be summed up in a single word: oil."[49] This reading of post-September 11 developments in the region found a large support among many Turkish analysts, and a number of studies raised the same argument, with the implication that those developments contributed to Turkey's strategic position.[50]
The construction of alternative pipelines to transport oil and gas from the region to the world markets was the crux of the issue, because the Caspian resources are landlocked. The methods and the routes through which the oil and gas are carried to world markets have direct geopolitical effects. But it had long been on the agenda, without a definite answer. Turkey had been pressing for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project. The developments in the wake of September 11 turned out to strengthen Turkey's hand in this issue. The U.S. threw its weight on Turkey's side and the construction of the pipeline is scheduled to start around September 2002, and finish by the end of 2004.[51]
Against this background, within Turkey there is a growing optimism that the cumulative effect of these developments will strengthen Turkey's position within the region and promote a Turkish zone of influence. However, this argument has, among others, the following limitations. A proactive Turkish engagement with Central Asia and the Caucasus is not a new concept.[52] After they gained independence with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the newly emerged Turkic states looked toward Turkey as a model. There was also a corresponding great enthusiasm in Turkey for closer relations with the region, as well as Western support to promote the 'Turkish model' that embedded secularism in a predominantly Muslim society, adapted capitalist-market economy, and a multi-party system, and prioritized Western orientation. For Turkey, this region was to offer a new area to expand Turkish influence and boost Turkey's geo-strategic value to the West. Turkish ambitions however remained largely unrealized, and soon that model started to decline in the face of the political realities of the region and changes in Western perceptions over time.[53] In Turkey itself, the demise of Turkish model was mainly due to Turkey's own constraints: the lack of enough financial and economic resources to meet the expectations of these countries. Given that the structural obstacles Turkey confronted in trying to enhance its influence in the region – the compatibility of Turkish model, the receptivity of the target governments, the role of other players, particularly Russia, and the constraints set upon Turkish foreign policy by domestic problems- remained unaltered, then expecting acceleration by the post-September 11 developments is difficult to sustain. Particularly, considering that Turkey is itself struggling to overcome its own economic and financial problems, the question arises as to how she will be able to engage in an active new role in the region.
Yet, the developments so far imply that Turkey's relations with the region in the new era are seen differently. Previously, Turkey was perceived as a model for the economic, social and political transformation of these countries. This time, the role expected from Turkey is limited to military and strategic field. In addition to the existing ones, Turkey has concluded several new military cooperation and education agreements with these countries. After September 11, Turkey stepped up its military assistance to Uzbekistan[54] and Kazakhstan[55], and to a lesser extent to Kyrgyzstan[56], by supplying arms and military equipments and offering military training for the modernization of the military capabilities of these nations. Moreover, after those countries allowed the U.S. to use their airspace and military bases before the military campaign in Afghanistan started, Turkish Air Force Command personnel conducted site surveys for possible airfields in Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to be used in air operations.[57] Likewise, post-September 11 developments and ensuing U.S. interest in the region had spillover effects in the Caucasus and provided an added impetus to the Turkish activism in the region. Besides the positive steps taken in the issue of pipeline projects and Turkey's close relations with Azerbaijan, Turkish-Georgian cooperation in the military field remarkably accelerated. Turkey had already started providing military assistance to Georgia in 1997. After the U.S. decision to establish military presence in Georgian,[58] Turkey's cooperation with Georgia became particularly important.[59]
Aside from those military contributions, Turkey tried to raise a common concern for terrorism in the region through bilateral visits, as well as on multilateral platforms. On 29-30 April 2002, the Presidents of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia held a summit meeting in Turkish city of Trabzon and signed an agreement to work together against terrorism, and also promised cooperation on the pipelines to bring the energy-rich region's resources to the West. The summit was completed with a joint press conference of the three leaders after the signing of the agreement of "The Struggle Against Terrorism, Organized Crime and Other Important Crimes".[60] Likewise, on June 4, 2002, the "Summit for Cooperation and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia" held in Kazakhstan's capital Almaty brought together heads of state of Turkey, China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Palestine, Israel, Egypt, Iran, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Azerbaijan. The leaders signed a "Declaration Aimed at Eradicating Terrorism and for Supporting a Dialogue between Civilizations", as well as an accord which included regulations, principles and commitments for establishing a comprehensive security mechanism.[61] Moreover, the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation organization (BSEC) on 25 June 2002 in Istanbul was another occasion where terrorism was discussed at a regional scale.[62]
All these imply that what is required from Turkey is for it to play a "subcontractor" role in the region, thus facilitate an American presence there within the wider context of the war on terrorism, rather than creating a genuine independent Turkish zone of influence, or promoting Turkish model once again. Therefore Turkey's ambitions and maneuverability are very much limited by international interests in the region. Moreover, a policy based primarily on limited contributions in military field, as long as lacking in economic dimension would be flawed. It is bound to remain temporary and once the conditions have changed, and the region returns to normalcy, the underlying realities may resurface and this policy may leave Turkey at a disadvantaged situation in political and economic terms.
This observation is strengthened by a parallel development in the way this region is treated by the international power centers. These countries are geographically landlocked with no direct connections to open seas. Moreover, they are also far from the prosperous Western markets. In the short run, they would not be able to attract significant foreign capital, except energy investments. They will probably be seen as "raw material suppliers," rather than as "emerging markets"; in other words, they will not be Asian tigers or Central and Eastern European Countries, but new Gulf states. For this reason, in the foreseeable future, the prospects for these countries to be part of the global market economy and move towards democratic pluralistic regimes are limited. They will be approached from a strategic perspective, and it is against this background that Turkey's pivotal role in the region can be better comprehended. In this context, as far as the optimism surrounding the launching the construction of Baku-Ceyhan pipeline is concerned, it must be kept in mind that a number of other developments might diminish the benefits of the pipelines to Turkey. Particularly the high pipeline construction costs, the possible developments that may come about concerning the alternative routes, such as Afghanistan,[63] and the tactics to be employed by other players could have adverse affects on the feasibility of the project.
A more definite reality, which speaks against Turkish ambitions in this region, is the changing shape of U.S.-Russian relations. Under Putin, Russia has chosen a non-confrontational type of relationship with the United States. Moreover, Putin has already come a long way toward restoring Russian power and influence in the region, and cementing Moscow's primacy, without being opposed by Washington.[64] In this regard, following September 11, Russia cooperated with the United States and did not resist U.S. military deployment in Central Asia and the Caucasus. At the same time, partly in return for its concurrence with U.S. engagement in the region, Russia also tried to utilize the international atmosphere and use the discourse of fighting against terrorism to justify its own activities in the region, thus strengthened its position.[65] Based on these developments, there are also some arguments that a U.S.-Russian rapprochement might better provide security and stability in this region, therefore the United States should also recognize Russian interests there. If events follow such a course, that will clearly create some problems for Turkey, since Turkey and Russia have been competing with each other in this area.[66] Nevertheless, it must be noted that many analysts refer to prospects for cooperation between the countries. Throughout the 1990s, contrary to earlier expectations, both sides had prioritized the economic interests and Turkish-Russian relations developed cooperatively.[67] Similarly it is argued that cooperation, rather than competition might be the case also after the September 11, and this cooperation might be extended beyond bilateral relations and include multidimensional partnership in Eurasia.[68]
As it was made clear so far, Turkey emerged as one of the leading actors in the fight against terrorism, hence it rigorously supported the international coalition against the Taliban and the al-Qaeda. When it became clear that the September 11 attacks had originated from Afghanistan and a military campaign was inevitably going to take place, the government was quick in obtaining a parliamentary authorization in October 2001 to contribute troops to the U.S. campaign. The bill, which was met with public opposition,[69] also authorized the government to allow the stationing of foreign troops on Turkish territory and permit the use of Turkish airspace and airbases.[70] However the Chief of Staff Kivrikoglu and other top officials expressed their hope that the scope of the conflict and Turkey's direct contribution would be limited. Reflecting the overall ambivalance of Turkish elite, while maintaining that Turkey cannot remain aloof to the developments in Afghanistan, Kivrikoglu at the same time called for a limited Turkish role leaving out active Turkish contribution to combat operations.[71] Turkish government however decided to contribute to the campaign by sending a unit of special forces to work with U.S. troops in humanitarian operations and train Northern Alliance fighters. Turkey also hinted that it could make its experience in guerilla warfare available, and it could help carve out a coalition between various Afghan factions against Taleban. Moreover, the U.S. benefited from Turkish airspace, used Incirlik airbase as a transport hub for the campaign, and according to some reports, was supplied intelligence by Turkey.[72] The rapid collapse of Taleban rule however made the possible role of Turkish soldiers in actual combat phase unclear, but soon a new rationale emerged. When the Taliban rule in Afghanistan came to an end, it became possible to launch international initiatives to rebuild the country, and the role of Turkey was again undeniable. Although it was not able to make a significant contribution in terms of financial and economic reconstruction aid, Turkey actively participated in the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF), charged with assisting the newly formed interim Afghan authority and with providing order and stability in the capital, Kabul. Within the framework of the ISAF, Turkey contributed to the training of a national Afghan police and military force and providing military aid and equipment, as well as patrolling Kabul and its environs. Moreover, in June 2002, when the British mandate was over, Turkey assumed the lead-nation role and took over the command of the ISAF.[73]
Based on these developments, it is claimed by most analysts that Turkey is going to become a more assertive power, not only in its immediate neighborhood, but also "out of area." In Turkish reasoning, its active support for the U.S. military campaign was a logical corollary of its position on fighting international terrorism. According to Primer Minister Ecevit, it was natural that Turkey joined a war against terror because the U.S. always stood behind Turkey, and he emphasized that the war had to be fought to the end until Taleban regime was wiped out.[74] For Turkey, at the same time, capitalizing on U.S.-led war on terrorism was a useful instrument to enhance its influence in Central Asia. By taking the strategic decision and taking active part also in military realm, Turkey sought to have a say in the future political landscape of not only Afghanistan, but also Central Asia. As regards active participation in ISAF, it was in line with its policy on peace operations, as it evolved in the post-Cold War era. Turkey has been involved in several U.N. and NATO peacekeeping missions, from Somalia to Bosnia and Kosovo. This time, through participating actively in the ISAF and commanding this multinational force, it could show its military capabilities and ability to project power abroad, and thus expand the Turkish sphere of influence.[75] More concretely, Turkey sought compensation for its military support in economic field.[76] Turkish economy which was already undergoing a severe crisis and was under an IMF program was hit by the September 11 shock badly. Turkish Economy Minister Kemal Dervis, after claiming that Turkey must support the international fight against terrorism because it had suffered a lot from similar threats, hinted that there may be a price. According to him, "Turkey's strategic importance for the European Union and NATO is increasing and within this strategic framework Western allies should consider the cost that Turkey will have to bear."[77] A similar reasoning was used by Ecevit for justifying assistance to the U.S.[78] In practical terms, that meant delay of loan payments, and when necessary provision of new IMF loans, as well as direct U.S. assistance.[79]
At the same time, similar to the general arguments regarding Turkey's being an example to the Muslim world, discussed earlier, it was also claimed that Turkey could become a model for Afghanistan as well. That a war against Afghanistan offered the possibility to replace the fundamentalist Taleban regime, which Turkey had been consistently opposed, was an important reason behind Turkey's support for American war. Prime Minister Ecevit was one of the vehement supporters of this view, and during his correspondence with President Bush he underlined that a military operation on Afghanistan should include the toppling Taleban regime.[80] He went on stating that the model to be introduced had to be one similar to Turkey's secular democratic model for peace, stability, and tranquility in Afghanistan. Here, at times, the discussions sometimes ran into an emotional mood. The deep historical ties between the two countries have been continuously repeated to underline the 'necessity' of Turkey's support for Afghan people: Afghanistan was the first country to recognize the new Turkish Republic; Turkey helped Afghanistan in its modernization efforts; Ataturk – the founding father of the modern Turkish Republic – put special emphasis on Afghanistan, and so on.[81] Some proponents of a proactive Turkish foreign policy went as far as maintaining that "the first country to recognize Kemal Atatürk's revolution and adopt the Turkish model was Afghanistan in 1921. Under the right political reformulation, to which Turkey will undoubtedly contribute, Afghanistan could be the first model in the post-Cold War period to rehabilitate itself through the methods and means provided in the historic Turkish national experiment."[82] However, Foreign Minister Cem, though acknowledging the universal validity of Turkish model, called for caution in that Turkish model "is not one that could be forced upon from the outside. What kind of a model they want, what kind of a model they need, and to what kind of a model they are ready are something to be decided upon by the Afghan people themselves."[83]
From American perspective, as discussed above, Turkey's support and participation into the coalition was useful to rebut allegations that the U.S. was engaged in a war against Islam. Therefore, similar to Turkish arguments, there were extensive references to Turkey's constituting a model for Afghanistan as well.[84] Moreover, besides its military contributions, as stated, Turkey had important linkages in the country and the region that could facilitate the U.S. presence there. As for peacekeeping phase, Turkey has a large standing army with accumulated experience in special operations and peacekeeping and as such it could spare its troops for such a mission.[85]
Yet, prospects for heightened expectations regarding region is difficult to substantiate.[86] First, Turkey's interest to Afghanistan is similar to the sudden discovery of Central Asia and Caucasus after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Therefore, because of the lack of any previous strategic perspective towards the country and the region, except for the Atatü era, raising the expectations conjecturally is highly problematic. Second, as was discussed earlier, Turkey's potential for becoming a model for the Muslim world is highly limited. In the case of Afghanistan, this is further limited by the particular characteristics of this war-torn country: The people of the country are illiterate and very closed-off from the world; the society is very much fragmented and economically collapsed. Considering that even in relatively more developed Muslim countries Western liberal values are not welcomed by the people, one may wonder how Turkey would be able to carry these values to Afghanistan.
In regards to military contributions and assuming the ISAF command, for sure they will give an important impetus for Turkey's role in the region, and international standing. However, if they are not backed by other economic and political incentives in the medium and long-term, their practical benefits could be severely limited. Particularly, if we judge based on the past experience about Turkey's earlier expectations regarding Central Asia, geographical distance and lack of enough means could further limit transforming this engagement into political influence. The effect of geographical distance and the global reach of the U.S. therefore should be carefully evaluated. As the empirical evidence about Central Asia suggests, although Turkey sees itself as a bridge to open up these countries to the West, the West was in fact able to establish direct contacts with these countries. Similarly, in a military sense, particularly during the preparation and conduct of the Operation Enduring Freedom, the U.S. was able to get the support of other regional powers, notably Pakistan, and as such minimized the role of Turkey in the overall operation.[87] Last but not least, the dynamism of U.S. foreign policy in the new era and whether Turkey can keep pace with it – how many such other engagements Turkey can sustain – should be taken into consideration in evaluating the impact of Afghanistan engagement on Turkish foreign policy. In this line, any shift of international interest away from the Central Asian region, especially if one considers the U.S. intentions to expand the war on terrorism, could also result in a situation where the novelty of the "strategic importance of the region" might wear off. In such a situation, this out-of-area role might lose the wider political context in which it takes place and turn out to be another sporadic short-term engagement.
Another area of activity in Turkish foreign policy was observed in Turkish-European Union relations. The basic Turkish argument could be summarized as follows: because the events of September 11 have proven Turkey's value, not only to the Americans but also to the Europeans, Turkey could now "anticipate a warmer West."[88] Turkey therefore tried to utilize this opportunity so as to cement its relations with both the U.S. and Europe by emphasizing its role as a significant pro-Western power in such a critical juncture. Moreover, there was a strong Turkish belief that in the new era opened up by September 11 events, because the concern for fighting international terrorism was going to be the major leitmotiv, the international system would be increasingly dominated by security-oriented considerations. That would, the argument goes, inevitably enhance the role of powerful security actors – such as the U.S. and NATO – at the expense of less powerful ones – EU members, and CFSP. By this way, the urgency of Turkey's relations with CFSP/ESDP was expected to diminish.[89] In this vein, besides the hope that Turkey's renewed importance would boost Turkish-European relations, there was therefore an additional impetus in the Turks' viewpoint: in the context of the growing American-Turkish strategic partnership, the Turks felt confident that the U.S. would not leave Ankara alone and would press the EU to satisfy Turkish demands. Therefore, the EU should appreciate the Turkish position in some of the problems dominating Turkish-European relations for some time.
The Turkish expectations that the EU and European countries would be more receptive to Turkey's position on fighting against terrorism have been already elaborated. Other issues which were supposedly going to be solved in a manner favorable to Turkey's interests included the Cyprus issue; the deadlock in the ESDP (European Security and Defense Policy); and Turkey's troubled EU membership process. There were indeed some initial positive steps in all those areas and a sense of optimism was inserted. [90] There appeared a chance to overcome the squabble over the ESDP-NATO relations and over what place Turkey would have in the development of the ESDP. In the run up to the Laeken Summit in December 2001, a consensus, called Ankara Document, was reached between Turkey, the United Kingdom and the U.S. Moreover, after a long pause, the dialogue between the leaders of the two communities on Cyprus was resumed. Both achievements were viewed as success by the Turkish politicians,[91] and the U.S. was said to have given stimulus to those developments.[92]
Without discussing all these issues in detail, at the risk of simplification, we would suggest that there are some fundamental challenges to Turkey's arguments, which would limit a sudden breakthrough in Turkish-EU relations. The main weakness of the Turkish discourse could be identified as follows. The initial rhetoric seemed to have perceived the West as a monolithic bloc.[93] Although this seemed to be true at the immediate aftermath of the September 11 terror attacks and all European powers expressed that they were united with the U.S. against the dangers of terrorism, after the novelty of the slogans of solidarity with the U.S. faded away, the underlying divergences in the transatlantic relations over a wide range of issues resurfaced. This was exacerbated by another feature of the approach taken by Turkey, which was to rely on U.S. pressure in its dealings with the EU. Those developments slowly put Turkey in an awkward position. First, because EU-U.S. relations were increasingly characterized by disagreements over several issues, and, transatlantic relations were more occupied with how to find a solution to those problems than with Turkey, in fact the urgency of Turkey's problems in the eyes of the U.S. was far away from meeting the Turks' expectations.[94] Even if one assumes that the U.S. would be inclined to support Turkey, it would approach Turkish-EU relations from a strategic perspective, and that may not be compatible with the actual realities of Turkey-EU relations and the expectations of the EU from Turkey. This reasoning applies largely to democratization and human rights priorities of the EU vis-à-vis Turkey, – the famous analogy of "democratic and stable Turkey versus stable and democratic Turkey." That could in turn lead to the next problem. Perhaps, this 'tactic' of using the relations with the U.S. as a leverage vis-à-vis the EU is likely to cultivate a mood of distrust between Turkey and the EU, as well as a friction between the EU and the U.S. Instead of creating a healthy dialogue with the EU, Turkey's use of its strategic ties with the United States and the U.S. lobbying as a stick against the EU was increasingly perceived as "a kind of low-intensity threat" against Brussels. In the long run, Ankara therefore hinders the creation of a strong channel of trust with the EU, and thus isolates itself. Against such a picture, it was no surprise that soon Turkish elite started to question Turkey's membership process into the EU. This was paralleled by another debate on whether Turkey should make a choice between the EU membership and strategic partnership with the US.[95]
Moreover, Turkish political elite's perception of the country as an actor indispensable to the West, particularly in political and strategic realm, is a cause for further problems. It is true that Turkey's role in the European security architecture is very vital, but a security-dominated discourse that lies at the basis of Turkish perceptions of the relations with Europe has an impact not only on the way Turkey values itself, but also on the actual course of the developments. At times, this leads to robust attitudes towards the EU and asking for concessions or a different treatment in a way to further hamper the integration process. More importantly, capitalizing on the strategic importance diverts the attention away from real problems and reduces the urgency for introducing and implementing economic, political, and cultural reforms demanded by the European integration process. The more Turkey is focused on its indispensability to the West, the less the country will be willing to undertake the necessary transformation in its journey towards EU membership. Therefore, the EU representatives were quick in making their positions clear against Turkey's attempts to capitalize on strategic importance and de-emphasize membership criteria. EU Commissioner responsible for enlargement, Gunter Verheugen, maintained that Turkey should meet the hard criteria to be a member of the EU, otherwise, the 'Whole Europe Integration Project' will lose its credibility. He went on saying that "(w)e will soften the conditions of Turkey's membership. In return, Turkey will give us the guarantee of strategic aid. We cannot make such a bargain."[96] Given that there were even initial expectations that, similar to Turkey's entry into NATO following its contribution of troops to Korean War, Turkey's participation into military campaign in Afghanistan could pay the way for Turkey's membership into EU, this warning is quite telling.
Last but not least, remembering that the underlying merit of the problems, which have so-far dominated Turkish-EU relations, is unlikely to disappear all of a sudden, even after September 11 we are further called to be cautious. The continuation of the Greek veto on the Ankara Document which, from Turkey's side,[97] resolved the tension over ESDP, and Turkey's futile attempts to force the EU to set a deadline for the start of membership negotiations are some of the examples. Therefore, a fundamental shift in the EU's policy towards Turkey just for the sake of Turkey's enhanced strategic importance is hard to expect. Rather, the determination to carry out the transformation on the domestic scene, and the speed with which Turkey delivers those changes in this process would continue to remain the single most important determining factor of Turkey's relations with the EU.
Having said that, we can move on to Turkish-American relations. As it has been underlined so far, in American point of view, Turkey came to be seen a critical country whose support and cooperation was essential. First, there was a strong belief in the United States that supporting moderate Muslim countries, which oppose terrorism and extremism, was the key to winning the war on terrorism. The Turkish model, which embeds Islam within a secular system, appeared to be the best candidate to fit this role. Moreover, Turkey's geographical location and experience in fighting terrorism made its cooperation essential to the international coalition against terrorism. Furthermore Turkey was more than willing to contribute to U.S. agenda in Afghanistan by providing troops to the peacekeeping force. As a result, Turkish-American relations, which were characterized by up-and-downs throughout the 1990s, started to receive renewed interest. As mentioned above, on several occasions, many American statesmen liked to call Turkey "a steadfast partner in war on terrorism."[98] The changed mood was observed not only in the declarations of American politicians, but also in the titles of articles written on the issue, which were at times heavily emotional. Here is an example: "Turkey and the US: A partnership rediscovered."[99]
From Turkey's perspective, the revival of strategic relations with the U.S. implied several potential advantages, and consequently the Turks expected more rigorous U.S. assistance in a number of areas: U.S. support in the campaign against PKK terrorism; the promise of enlarged exports to American markets; the removal of obstacles to military transfers to Turkey; U.S. backing of Turkish command of Afghan peacekeepers and Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project; American support for further IMF loans; and American support for Turkey's other foreign policy issues, such as Cyprus, the ESDP and EU membership. Another repeated theme in the Turkish arguments was that, contrary to the Europeans, the U.S. had always been more supportive and sensitive to Turkey's demands in most of those contentious issues, thus it was a partner to be relied on. As a result, after September 11, Turkish-American relations which were characterized as 'strategic partnership' by President Clinton in 1999 have been further deepened.[100] In this regards, the Prime Minister Ecevit's visit to Washington On January 14-19 was a climax, which provided an important occasion to cement the strategic partnership.[101]
Indeed, in principle, it is hard to ignore that American-Turkish relations converge to a large extent. It was this convergence of interests and shared strategic vision that constituted the basis of some common policies towards a number of issues and regions, such as Balkans, and Caucasus. Nevertheless, one should not underestimate some limitations, which force us to take a more cautious stance. To start with, growing references to Turkey's renewed strategic importance in the wake of September 11 attacks inevitably reproduces the basic nature of Turkish-American relations, which were heavily security-dominated. Because there are mutual security-related concerns in several issues and regions, this is of course understandable. However, as in the past, this situation leaves Turkey very much depended on the shifting American strategic priorities. Because it remains the passive receiver of the external conditions in this partnership, Turkey is deprived of the ability to form the shape and direction of this partnership according its own agenda and priorities.
Such considerations in mind, after September 11, there were in fact serious attempts to diversify the relationship and give it a more solid standing. However given that the U.S. foreign policy is itself going to be largely driven by a "security first" discourse, and some underlying problems are still there, one has to wait to judge whether a major step towards diversification could be realized. Among others, the most attractive attempt towards diversification one was the proposal to increase trade volume between Turkey and the United States. The idea of increasing economic ties with the U.S. is in fact not new, and has been on the agenda since the Gulf War. To compensate Turkey's losses in the war, there was a discussion about how the U.S. could help Turkey. Then president of the country, Turgut Ozal, was also raising a similar argument by saying: "we don't want direct financial aid, what we need is more trade with the United States. For this, the United States should abolish textile quotas and other barriers to trade." Yet once the war was over, Turkey's demands were forgotten and Turkey was left alone to deal with its economic problems.
This time, following Prime Minister Ecevit's visit to Washington in mid-January, the strengthening of Turkish-American trade relations and adding an economic dimension to the strategic partnership came once more on the agenda.[102] At a press conference in Washington, Ecevit said the outcome of his contacts deserved the highest marks: "adding economic partnership to political and military alliance with the United States is an event that deserve 10 marks."[103] To this end, a Turkish-American Economic Partnership Commission was established to handle all economic and trade related issues between Turkey and the U.S.[104] It had its first meeting in Ankara in February.[105] Yet, the conclusions of these meetings were far from meeting Turkish expectations. Moreover, the plan to establish Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ) was also criticized due to the fact that instead of establishing a direct relationship between the U.S. and Turkey, the American side preferred a quick-fix solution and tried to incorporate Turkey into the existing QIZ between Israel and the U.S.[106] This small example is indicative of the fact that the Bush administration was not ready to take the painful step and go to the Congress in order to seek a legislation to establish closer economic relations with Turkey because of the opposition in Congress. Therefore, in assessing Turkish-American relations, one has to bear in mind the fact that U.S. policies can shift easily because of different factors affecting U.S. policy making, such as lobbying, Congress and internal American debates on how to conduct U.S. foreign policy. At the moment, there are many supporters of Turkey in the Bush administration but this cannot be taken for granted forever, and there is still strong opposition within Congress against Turkey.[107] The expectation of full, unqualified U.S. support for all the issues mentioned above is therefore overly optimistic, and the developments so far prove this observation.
Moreover, as a matter of fact, despite the convergence of priorities at strategic level – having concurrent interests on broad issues and regions –, divergence might be the case at the practical level. In addressing certain tangible issues, the approaches to be taken might not be always mutually agreeable. Likewise, even when both countries' positions overlap on a certain case, that should not lead to overlooking the fundamental characteristic of this relationship which stem from the relative positions of the partners towards each other: the concerns of Turkey and the U.S. are guided by entirely different sets of foreign policy priorities, – a global hegemon versus regional power. Therefore, the possibility that there could be diverging, even conflicting, interests and priories on certain issues is always there. Over-activism observed in the U.S. foreign policy in the new era is likely to further amplify this problem.
In this regard, as it was underlined, though the issue of terrorism might be a common concern to both Europe and America, when it comes to dealing with it there might appear some diverging opinions. A similar reasoning does in fact apply to Turkish-American relations. Turks repeatedly liked to argue that the US war against terrorism is a policy parallel to that of Turkey. As Turkish Ambassador to the U.S. Osman Faruk Logoglu underlined: "we are at the forefront of the war, as a friend, as an ally, and in reciprocation for the United States' understanding of our own fight against terrorism."[108] But, in reality, soon it became clear that there exist some fundamental differences, as well as diverging interests. The controversy over a possible military operation against Iraq is the case in point, which is also illustrative of the perils Turkey's geo-strategic importance may at times cause.
Turkey's geographical location was its main asset, but at the same time, it also produced Turkey's greatest headache: Iraq. In an effort to root out the sources of international terrorism, the U.S. shifted its focus to the so-called rogue states, and President Bush took this one step further by declaring Iraq, Iran and North Korea as the axis of evil. Even before this speech, extending the military operations against Iraq was on the U.S. agenda. Following developments such as the supposed Iraq-al-Qaeda links, the anthrax cases and the dispute over U.N. arms inspections in the country, made Iraq the next potential target for the U.S. fight against terrorism. This inevitably brought Turkey to the fore anew, due to its strategic value in a future war against Iraq.
However Turkey strongly opposed to a possible extension of war against Iraq. Before September 11, the Turkish government had been trying to normalize relations with Iraq despite U.S. opposition in order to compensate for the economic losses resulting from the UN-imposed embargo on Iraq. Therefore, the U.S. determination to intervene in Iraq was an unwelcome development. Yet, the real problem lies somewhere else. There is a fear that the operations against Iraq and the turmoil created by post-Saddam political developments might have serious repercussions for Turkish security. Turkey is worried that the war against Iraq might end up with the breakup of Iraq and the establishment of a Kurdish state in the northern part of Iraq. Such a possibility would, from the Turkish perspective, encourage Kurdish separatist elements within Turkey. For this reason, Turkey's main priority is that an operation against Iraq should be avoided to the extent possible; and if it is going to take place anyway, Iraq should remain one nation. Yet, it appears that once an operation against Iraq starts, it would be almost impossible for Turkey to keep itself outside. In such a situation, the nightmare is that the Turkish army might be forced to occupy northern Iraq to prevent the emergence of an independent Kurdish state there, and affect the post-Saddam political developments in Iraq. Such a policy may not be compatible with the U.S. agenda in Iraq, and Turkish-American interests could move towards sharpened divergence.
Indeed, it was persuasively argued by some Turkish analysts that managing divergence and reaching a common position on Iraqi issue could be the 'test case' for Turkish-American partnership. In a critical account of the optimism following Ecevit's Washington visit, Cengiz Candar puts it blatantly: "Turkey's protection by America on 'political and economic platforms' depends to a large extent Turkey's ability to act in tune with America on the issue of Iraq. I mean, as Turkey, you would oppose to an American operation in Iraq; but at the same time you would become a 'strategic partner' with the U.S., and you would rely on U.S. 'economic assistance' to Turkey unreservedly. That won't happen. Cannot happen... Saddam is the 'gist' of the calculations on Turkish-American relations and 'strategic partnership'."[109] Moreover, everything comes with a certain price. It is therefore noted that the deepening of strategic partnership and the generous support Turkey receives from the U.S. administration, ironically, intensifies Turkey's dependence on the U.S. with the effect that the burden of being a 'strategic ally' limits the room of maneuver for Turkey.[110] However, given the obvious divergence of positions towards Iraq, that situation only adds to the complexity of Turkey's uncomfortable partnership with the U.S.
Last but not least, one should also bear in mind that Turkey's willingness to engage in active policies on several fronts simultaneously is likely to confront it with the problem of having the necessary capabilities and setting the priorities. Particularly, the wish to enhance the relations with Europe, while at the same time moving towards a deepened 'strategic partnership' with the U.S. and engaging in a proactive policy in Eurasia, would be increasingly difficult to reconcile. Perhaps, as was discussed in the previous section, the debate over whether to choose between membership into the EU and strategic partnership with the U.S. was just an early indicator of the dilemmas of a 'multi-dimensional' assertive foreign policy.
Now, let us change the course from the foreign policy issues, and talk about the impact of post-September 11 developments on Turkey's domestic economic problems. Since early 2001, a severe economic crisis has been hitting the Turkish economy. The crisis devastated the industrial sector, lowered living standards, raised unemployment and jeopardized Turkey's international financial solvency.[111] In dealing with the crisis, Turkey received a significant amount of IMF credits, which in total amounted to more than $30 billion. American support was crucial for Turkey getting this IMF aid. Because Turkey emerged as a critical ally and the 'best model' for the Islamic countries in the new era, from American perspective, Turkey had to be supported economically. By this way the U.S. could not only assure Turkey's cooperation but also send a strong message that it would never leave a U.S. ally and Muslim country alone, when it is in need. The remarks by a U.S. Congressman, Robert Wexler, are quite telling: "An economic collapse in Turkey would be disastrous for America... America has got to treat the economy of Turkey as if is the economy of New Jersey."[112]
Although the Turkish side repeatedly claims that the IMF credits were provided to Turkey without any political concessions, there is a perception, both at home and abroad, that without the war in Afghanistan and the Turkish support in the campaign against terrorism, the IMF would have never given such a huge amount of money to Turkey. Even according to some analogies, Turkey could have had a catastrophe similar to what happened in Argentina.[113] As quoted above, Turkish Economy Minister Dervis, who took over the Turkish economy in March 2001, and Prime Minister Ecevit made strong linkages between Turkey's support for the international fight against terrorism and economic assistance to Turkey.[114] Similarly, representatives of Turkish private sector were more than willing to argue on strategic grounds. According to the Chairman of Turkish-US Business Council, Akin Öngör, if the Americans do ignore Turkey and fail to support it economically, they would not be able to go to bed in safety.[115]
Whatever the exact motives behind the IMF decisions might be, the fact is that with IMF help Turkey was able to control the economy in the short term and avert a catastrophe. Yet, in the long-term this situation may have some negative consequences. As long as the economic and political system remains decayed and structural problems cannot be remedied, the injection of foreign capital into the economy is bound to have a short-term effect. There is growing speculation by financial analysts that Turkey's total debts, which now exceed its gross national product, may create serious problems in the servicing and repayment of the growing debts.[116]
In assessing the performance of an economy and the issue of foreign assistance, perhaps, what is more important than receiving direct aid is the amount of foreign investments flowing into a country. In this regard, Turkey does not have a promising picture. According to a recent report conducted by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, between 1998-2000, Turkey ranked 122nd among 137 countries in terms of foreign capital inflow.[117] The reasons behind why foreign investors did not prefer Turkey mainly included macroeconomic instability, widespread corruption and the complex nature of the transactions that needed to be fulfilled. As a result, later Turkey decided to take steps towards reforming its foreign investment rules, as part of its IMF-backed reform process.[118] Another study reveals the other side of the coin: The amount of Turkish capital which is invested abroad, especially in Switzerland and Luxembourg, is estimated to be $70 billion. Most of this money left Turkey after the economic crises for the purpose of securing the money abroad, since domestic investors lost their reliance on the Turkish economy.[119]
Here is the real paradox of Turkey: With a new crisis in the region, Turks think that the country has become strategically important. Yet, in political and economical terms it is considered to be a 'risky' place to invest, because its economic system is not stable and possible conflicts in the region pose threats to the country. If everybody is convinced that an operation against Iraq is inevitable, and if the deputy prime minister of the country maintains that an operation would destabilize the whole region, then, one wonders how international and domestic investors could be convinced that it is reasonable to invest in Turkey.
Moreover, the belief that "they cannot ignore us! They have to help us economically and financially, because we are strategically important" is not a good one. First, this mood would hinder domestic determination and the ability to solve the country's problems on its own. Moreover, this would result in taking the economic reforms not so seriously, and, in turn, diminish the self-discipline and self-control necessary for economic transformation. Therefore, how Turkey will be able to solve the vicious cycle of economic crises remains an open question.
Those economic problems, in turn, limit the country's ability to act independently in its foreign policy, as was observed in discussions about a possible operation against Iraq. On a TV show on America Fox-News channel, to the severe annoyance of many Turks, even one American analyst, former Clinton adviser Dick Morris, was claiming that "Turkey has to support us; because the owner of Turkey is the IMF, and the IMF has already paid Turkey for this service."[120] This 'dependency' applies to other cases as well. Many American analysts did not hesitate to make references to American support for further IMF aid to Turkey in arguing for the relevancy of the 'dependent alliance' between Turkey and the U.S. Daniel Nelson, for instance, argues that "Turkey needs American and the US needs Turkey. Aside from a Republican administration in Washington, Turkey hears only criticism of human rights record, and sees ongoing exclusion from Europe. Without Washington, US$ 10 billion in further IMF loans would have been impossible, and the image of an Argentina catastrophe would loom. Without Washington, Athens' place in the EU would mean intensified pressures to back away from the Turkish Republic on Cyprus. America has been a better friend than any alternative."[121]
On the other hand, there is a fundamental contradiction in the interplay between economics and strategic importance in the new era. The increasing strategic importance and the requirements of the new activism stemming from it, in fact, do not coincide with Turkish economy's needs and priorities. Whereas Turkey is undergoing a severe economic crisis and experiencing shortage of capital, the new engagements as part of Turkish contribution to international fight against terrorism, which are no doubt costly, do require a solid economic backing. For instance, although Turkey was more than willing to contribute actively and assume the command of ISAF in Afghanistan, the financial burden of this operation delayed the negotiations.[122] For a long time, Ankara's worries for the financial repercussions of Turkish contributions and the funding issue could not be met by the U.S. and U.K. Turkey's repeated demands for western funding of the ISAF fell on deaf ears for a long time. It was reported that Washington was reluctant to provide extra financial support for Ankara on ISAF because billions of dollars in IMF loans had already been provided to Turkey to help its recovery from the financial crisis.[123] There were even some speculations that Turkey could give up its quest for ISAF leadership, based on financial and other considerations.[124] However, after prolonged discussions, at the end, it was only American assurances that Turkey was able to accept to lead the force.[125] Similarly, because Turkey is keen on power projection beyond its borders, in order to sustain her military engagements abroad, there is a willingness to spend further on military procurement in the aftermath of September 11. For instance, one of the biggest Turkish defense projects came to a realization stage, and Turkey successfully concluded the negotiations for the purchase of four AWACS early warning aircraft from the Boeing. The financial cost of that project to Turkey is expected to be around US$ 1.1 billion.[126] One has to wait and see how it will be possible to reconcile those strategic calculations requiring heavy military spending with the current needs of Turkish economy.
Before concluding this section, it must be underlined that the interplay between economics and Turkey's strategic importance is problematic also in other aspects. Turkey's over-emphasis on its geo-strategic position and its strategic value to the West, and the determination to transform this into tangible economic benefits could work at the time of crises. However, it must be kept mind that such a policy could also turn out to be self-defeating in the long-run. One cannot take the geostrategic value granted; rather it may change over time and depending on the case under consideration. Therefore, if Turkey is serious in solving its economic problems, it has to focus on structural remedies, rather than conjectural external developments. More importantly, using its politico-military contributions to Western security so as to gain leverage in economic realm may diminish the trust between itself and its allies, and in the longer run that may affect the relations or partnerships adversely.
In light of the activism observed in the fields discussed so far, the dominant view is that the post September 11 events have contributed to Turkey's strategic importance, thus have helped reshape Turkey's relations with the United States and Europe, as well as with the countries in its neighborhood. As expressed by Foreign Minister Cem, "the unfortunate events of September 11, 2001 and ensuing developments have confirmed and consolidated some fundamental preferences of the Turkish foreign policy. Besides, they have boosted Turkey's strategic importance."[127] It might even, according to these arguments, stimulate the long-delayed redefinition of Turkey's role in the post-Cold War world. Here is an excellent example of such arguments: "What is required in the current circumstance is for Turkey to seize the strategic initiative, with bold political leadership that articulates Turkey's national security aspirations within the new regional context. An historic window of opportunity exists for Turks, with Western support and encouragement, to emerge from their bunker mentality and assert themselves in shaping a positive historical trend outside their borders... Turkey is ready... What remains is for the West, and specifically the United States, to help Turkey mobilize its potential."[128]
Although overall it is true that Turkey's international standing has been visibly enhanced, as it has been made clear so far, there is however need for a more cautious approach in assessing the post-September 11 developments on Turkish foreign policy. We would argue that the best way to discus the Turkish role is to analyze it in the context of regional power. Turks have ambitious and, at times, over-exaggerated expectations about their country's international position, but, in reality, Turkey is mainly acting as a pivotal power. This can be best observed in the discussions regarding the Turkish role in Afghanistan, and Turkey's relations with Central Asia and the Caucuses. For example, on the one hand, Turkey is trying to lead the ISAF, but on the other hand it is asking the United States to pay its financial expenses and provide Turkey with the necessary transport, intelligence and logistic facilities. This is exactly the dilemma the country as is facing as a pivotal state. This necessarily brings us to the issue of the mismatch between the capabilities and foreign policy vision. One has to admit that, as the things stand, the gap between Turkey's capabilities and its expectations is difficult to bridge in the short-run. As a result, Turkey's ability to act as an independent actor initiating its own projects is severely limited by, or depends on, the degree to which it will be successful in managing balancing its own priorities with external factors. That means, Turkey could act in cooperation with other global and regional powers, and mobilize their support in the areas of converging interests. By this way, Turkey can both advance its own interests and contribute to the agenda of its partners. However to the extent that Turkey's interest will diverge from those of its partners it will be increasingly difficult to follow an independent course. If this is chosen, the growing divergence may run the risk of confrontation. This point, which many advocates of Turkey's strategic importance fail to see, must be the basis of any assessment on Turkish foreign policy. That dictates that Turkey should seriously get engaged in a comprehensive and in-depth debate on its role in the world and in the region, what capabilities instruments are at its disposal, what foreign policy vision it envisages, and what are its priorities. Such a debate should be conducted by leaving aside the influence of short-term, conjectural developments, and focusing more on setting long-term structural priorities. The responses to those questions are of vital importance for the successful resolution of not only foreign policy but also domestic problems the country is facing.
This segues into our next observation regarding post-September debate on Turkey's strategic importance. The arguments raised for Turkey's enhanced strategic importance are very similar to those employed at the beginning of the 1990s, following the Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Yet, remembering that the euphoria of the 1990s remained largely unrealized and diverted the country's attention away from more important policy objectives, it would be legitimate to argue that it is high time for Turkey to see the facts in a more realistic manner. First, that means, the foreign policy issues that are on Turkey's agenda will evolve according to the actual realities of the issue under consideration, rather than altered strategic conditions. It is true that increased strategic value of the country may have positive effects on its international standing but in such contentious issues as the relations with Europe or America, the underlying sources of cooperation or divergence will not vanish. Therefore it would be wrong for Turkey to choose the easier way of capitalizing on its strategic importance and downplaying the necessary steps it needs to take in its foreign and security policies.
Second, the need for a more realistic vision on Turkish foreign policy has also implications on domestic realm. Whatever model it follows in its foreign policy, or whatever priorities it sets for itself, be it EU membership, leadership in Eurasia, or strategic partnership with the US, Turkey's international performance will depend above all its capability to solve problems internally and reach economic and political peace and tranquility. In this respect, a rational assessment of the country's international role would help avoid unnecessary external adventures and enable it to direct its attention to necessary domestic transformation. The economic, political and diplomatic problems facing the country are structural and fundamental; they cannot be solved through a simple redefinition of Turkey's strategic role in the new conjuncture. Engaging in ambitious external projects or relying on the tempting idea of Turkey's indispensability to its Western partners would diminish the urgency for reform and take the focus of the country away from economic and political modernization. Economic reforms, political transformation and human rights and democratization issues would receive less attention compared to the life-and-death problems of national sovereignty and national security. A choice is, therefore, being forced upon Turkey. Either it will aspire to become a so-called "stable" regional or pivotal power willing to project power beyond its borders, by maintaining and reproducing the current political culture, which is dominated by military and security considerations, or it will choose to become an ordinary, but "democratic" and self-sufficient state, by focusing on the necessary economic and political reforms and restructuring and transformation of its system.
This is definitely not an easy task. To be sure, Turkey's geographical location offers many advantages. Yet, the very same reality is also a source of problems for the country. Whether one likes it or not, we are living in this volatile region, characterized by several actual and potential crises. For instance, two states that belong to the so-called "axis of evil" are Turkey's neighbors; and any development in the surrounding regions forces Turkey to get involved in one way or another. This is the reality in which we are living. If we cannot escape this reality, then what we can do is to act in a rational manner with a long-term perspective, based on carefully-elaborated priorities, instead of being dictated by self-propaganda, conjectural calculations and short-term gains.
[1] For more information on the PKK, see the extensive analysis provided in: Nihat Ali Özcan, PKK (Kürdistan Isci Partisi): Tarihi, Ideolojisi, ve Yöntemi (PKK: Its History, Ideology and Methodology) (Ankara: ASAM Yayinlari, 1999); for the international dimension in PKK's emergence and operations, in particular, see. pp.222-325; Michael Radu, "The Rise and Fall of the PKK," Orbis (Vol.45, No.1, Winter 2001), pp.47-63; Kemal Kirisci and Gareth Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey (London: Frank Cass, 1997).
[2] But, it must be underlined that in order not to internationalize PKK issue, and keep the PKK from becoming an interlocutor Turkey was cautious in those endeavors. Therefore, it mainly tried to include terror as a whole into NATO statements.
[3] see: Svante E. Cornell, 'The Kurdish Question in Turkish Politics', Orbis (Vol.45, No.1, Winter 2001), pp.31-46.
[4] This somewhat extremely critical interpretation of Turkey's place in European Security architecture can be found in Dietrich Jung, Turkey and Europe: Ongoing Hypocrisy? (Copenhagen Peace Research Institute: Working Paper 35, September 2001), pp.1-21; for a counter view: Meltem Müftüler-Bac, 'Turkey's Role in the EU's Security and Foreign Policies', Security Dialogue (Vol. 31, No. 4, 2000), pp. 489-502.
[5] See several Turkish dailies from September 12-13, 2001. Also, for a collection, see, Newspot (No.29, September-October 2001).
[6] Cumhuriyet, 13 September 2001; "Sezer: I Reckon Western Countries are Going to View Terrorism Differently from now on", Turkish Daily News, (13 September 2001).
[7] "Shifting of international perceptions on the agenda; a new role for Turkey", Turkish Daily News, 13 September 2001; for more on initial Turkish position, see: Baki Ilkin, "Combating Terrorism and Rebuilding Afghanistan: The Turkish Perspective", Foreign Policy-Ankara (Vol.27, Nos.3-4, 2002), pp.3-9.
[8] Ismail Cem, Statement to the Press at the Organization of the Islamic Conference (Doha: 10 October 2001), reprinted in Newspot (No.29, September-October 2001); "Turkish top officials call for increase in international cooperation against terrorism" Turkish Daily News, (13 September 2001); Similarly see: Mustafa Balbay (columnist), "Terör Sinir Tanimiyor" (Terror Recognizes no Borders), Cumhuriyet (12 September 2001); Turkish Industrialists and Businessman Association (TUSIAD) also stated that the events that terro attacks exposed the dimensions of international terrorism and that there is a need for international cooperation and solidarity to fight against international terrorism, Milliyet 13 September 2001.
[9] Cumhuriyet, 14 September 2001; "Ankara backs activating Article 5" Turkish Daily News, (14 September 2001).
[10] Rusen Cakir, "Global 28 Subat Süreci Basladi" (Global 28 Subat Process has Taken a Start) Hurriyet, 15 September 2001.
[11] For a similar view, see: Murat Belge, "Jeopolitik," Radikal, 22 January 2002.
[12] Michael Radu, "The War on Terrorism is not an American War", Insight Turkey, Vol.3, No.4, October-December 2001, pp.52,54.
[13] "Cem: Turkish Model is Paradigm of Civilization" Interview given to Turkish Daily News, 7 January 2002.
[14] For an early skeptical approach by Sadi Erguvenc, see: Lale Sariibrahimoglu, "Turkey Should be Cautious on Article 5", Turkish Daily News, 14 September 2001; however Ozdag underlines that although it may not act as an automatic trigger, NATO's invocation of Article-5 might be used as a precedent, "Interview with Ümit Özdag", 2023 (No.6, 15 October 2002), p.23.
[15] on different perceptions of the issue in Turkey and Europe, see: Cornell, op.cit., p.31; for an analysis approaching Kurdish issue through a human rights and democratization perspective, see: H. Ayla Kilic, "Democratizaton, Human Rights and Ethnic Policies in Turkey", Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs (April 1998, Vol.18, No.1),pp.91-110.
[16] For an optimistic view that after September 11, PKK issue would no longer be considered within the context of ethnic conflict or independence movement, see: S. Rana Sezal, "Kimlik Politikalari, Terör ve Etnik Catisma Kavramlari: 11 Eylül Sonrasi Türkiye'nin Terör Sorunu", Stratejik Analiz (Vol.2, No.20, December 2001), p.100.
[17] See for instance: Gülistan Gürbey, "Die Europaesierung des Kurdenkonflikts", Blaetter für Deutsche und Internationale Politik (4:99), p.404.
[18] Ali L. Karaosmanoglu, "Afganistan Savasi'nin Transatlantik Iliski Boyutu" (The Transatlantic Relations of the Afghanistan War and its Consequences with Regard to Turkey) Zaman, 27 November 2001, p.10.
[19] for an argument to the effect that Turkey could capitalize on U.S. interpretation of terror and thus solve its own PKK problem, see: Damla Aras, "Minareyi Calan Kilifi Hazirladi: Bir Baska Acidan 11 Eylul", Stratejik Analiz (Vol.2, No.24, April 2002), p.39.
[20] Ali Nihat Özcan, a Turkish expert on terrorism, also points out that the selective response to terror in Europe would limit Turkey's utilization of the new conditions. "BM Karari ve PKK", NTV: Arka Plan, 03 October 2001; transcript of this TV interview.
[21] Selcuk Gültasli "The Opportunity and the Principle", Turkish Probe (Issue 479, 31 March 2002).
[22] "Türkiye Brüksel'de Zafer Kazandi" (Turkey won a victory in Brussels) www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr news portal, 3 May 2002.
[23] Mehmet Ali Birand, "PKK or KADEK", Turkish Daily News, 2 April 2002.
[24] Ali Nihat Özcan, Ö.Rengin Gün, "PKK'dan KADEK'e: Degisim mi Takkiye mi?", Stratejik Analiz (Vol.2, No.25, May 2002), pp.5-20.
[25] "DHKP/C and PKK on EU Terrorist List" Turkish News, 03 May 2002; "Belgian Judicial Officials: There is not much to do against the PKK and DHKP-C", Turkish Daily News, 6 May 2002.
[26] "DHKP-C: The List did not Affect Us", Turkish Daily News, 10 May 2002.
[27] "With Turkey's Pledge, U.S. Coalition Gets its First Muslim Troops," International Herald Tribune November 2, 2001.
[28] Matt Kelley, "America Must Support Moderate Muslims to Win War on Terror. No. 2 Pentagon Official Says", Turkish Daily News, 11 March 2002; also see: United States Department of Defense, "Bridging the Dangerous Gap between the West and the Muslim World", Remarks Prepared for Delivery by Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz at the World Affairs Council, Monterey, CA, Friday, May 3, 2002.
[29] "Turkey a Model Secular Country: Bush", www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr news portal, 18 March 2002; also see: "21st ATC conference held in Washington," Turkish Daily News, 19 March 2002.
[30] U.S. Department of State, "Grossman: Change in the Value of Enduring Alliances," Remarks to the American Turkish Council by U.S Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman, Washington, D.C., March 19, 2002.
[31] See: Anas Malik, "Selected Reflections on the Muslim World in the aftermath of 9-11," Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2002, pp.201-225.
[32] "Ecevit'ten Teröre Karsi Dayanisma cagrisi", Hürriyet, 12 September 2001, "ABD'nin Yanindayiz", Hürriyet, 13 September 2001; For several Turkish intellectuals' response: "Linkage to Islam rejected," Turkish Daily News, 14 September 2001.
[33] Ismail Cem, "Statement to the Press."
[34] For the coverage of the Forum in Turkish Press see: http://www.byegm.gov.tr/on-sayfa/oic/oic.htm; also see the information provided on Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' webpage: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/OIC_EU_cdrom/index.htm.
[35] Elif Ünal, "West and East Attempt to Bridge Differences in Turkey," Turkish Probe, No.473, 10 February 2002.
[36] "Cem: Turkish Model is Paradigm of Civilization".
[37] In a sense, this was a duty on Turkey, see: Karaosmanoglu, "Afganistan Savasi'nin Transatlantik Iliski Boyutu".
[38] "Bu, Demokrasi ile Terörizmin Kavgasi" Hürriyet, 14 September 2001.
[39] Dale F. Eickelman "Turkey between the West and the Rest," Turkish Probe, No.474, 17 February, 2002.
[40] See: Ilter Turan, "Short Term Pains for Long Term Pleasures," Private View, Spring 2001, p.10.
[41] Orhan Gökce and Birol Akgün, Degisen Dünya Politikasinda Türkiye'nin Rolü: 11 Eylül'ün Getirdigi Firsatlar, Riskler ve Tehditler (Turkey's Role in the Changing World Politics: Opportunities, Risks and Threats Brough about by September 11), Paper Presented at First METU International Relations Conference, Ankara, 3-5 July 2002, p.14.
[42] for more on the motivations and contributions of those countries, see: Alec Rasizade, "The New 'Great Game' in Central Asia after Afghanistan," Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2002, pp.132-134.; for Uzbekistan, see: Nermin Güler "Özbekistan Dis Politikasinda Dönüm Noktasi: 11 Eylül," Stratejik Analiz, Vol.2, No.20, December 2001, pp.59-65; for the contribution of those countries to the U.S. operations see: Department of Defense (DOD), International Contributions to the War Against Terrorism, Fact Sheet: June 7, 2002.
[43] See the next section on Afghanistan.
[44] Osman Nuri Aras, "Yasanan Yeni Surecte Avrasya Enerji Kaynaklarinin Yeri ve Önemi" (The Place and Importance of Eurosian Energy Resources in the New Process", 2023, 15 November 2001, No.7, p.38.
[45] M. E. Ahrari with James Beal, The New Great Game in Muslim Central Asia, McNair Paper 47, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1996; Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard : American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1997).
[46] Rasizade, op.cit., p.125.
[47] Bülent Gökay, "The Most Dangerous Game in the World: Oil, War, and U.S. Global Hegemony," Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2002, p.48.
[48] Ibid, p.49.
[49] Frank Viviano, San Francisco Chronicle, 26 September 2001, quoted by Gökay, op.cit., p. 61.
[50] See for instance: Editorial, "Türkiye, Hazar, ve Afganistan Ekseninde Petro-politik" (Petro-politics at the axis of Turkey, Caspian and Afghanistan", 2023, 15 November 2001, No.7, pp.8-15; Nadir Biyikoglu, "Afganistan Gercegi ve Büyük Oyun'a Dönüs", (The Reality of Afghanistan and Return to the Great Game), 2023, 15 November 2001, No.7, pp.16-21; Aras, op.cit.
[51] "Bush Voices Support for Oil and Gas Pipelines Leading from Caspian to Turkey," Turkish Daily News, 5 June 2002.
[52] Graham E. Fuller, "Turkey's New Eastern Orientation," in Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser, Turkey's New Geopolitics:From the Balkans to Western China, Boulder, CO: Westview/RAND, 1993, pp. 37-97.
[53] Idris Bal, Turkey's Relations with the West and the Turkic Republics: The Rise and Fall of the 'Turkish Model', Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000.
[54] "Turkey Equips, Trains Uzbek Military," Turkish Daily News, 7 March 2002; "Kivrikoglu Visits Uzbekistan; Signs Deal for Military Assistance," Turkish Daily News, 19 March 2002;.
[55] RFE/RL Central Asian Report, Vol. 2, No. 11, 21 March 2002.
[56] "Turkey, Kyrgyzstan Aim at Strategic Partnership," Turkish Daily News, 22 February 2002.
[57] DOD, International Contributions, p.12.
[58] "U.S. Military in Georgia Will Increase Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Security," Turkish Daily News, 7 March 2002; for the effects of this new development on the region, see: Kamil Agacan, "ABD'nin Gürcistan'a Asker Göndermesi: Terörle Mücadelede Üçüncü Cephe mi, Yoksa Köprübasi mi?," Stratejik Analiz (Vol.2, No.24, April 2002), pp.69-76.
[59] "Turkey Donates Vehicles, Communications Equipment to Georgian Military," Turkish Daily News, 7 March 2002; "Turkey Gives Military Aid to Georgia," Turkish Daily News, 12 June 2002; it should also be noted that the U.S. policy towards Azerbaijan has also changed. In December 2001, Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, preventing U.S. from direct U.S. government assistance to Azerbaijan was revoked.
[60] "Caucasus Cooperation Agreement against Terrorism Signed," Turkish Daily News, 1 May 2002; an agreement was reached on holding the summit regularly in the coming years, Disisleri Güncesi, April 2002; However, it was criticized because it failed to include some key players of the region, notably Russia, Armenia and Iran, see: Yusuf Kanli, "A Summit with Missing Key Players," Turkish Daily News, 1 May 2002; for more on the impact of the summit on the region, see:Hasan Kanbolat, "Türkiye-Azerbaycan-Gürcistan Zirvesi ve Bölgedeki Ortak," Stratejik Analiz (Vol.3, No.26, June 2002), pp.52-57.
[61] Newspot, No.33, May-June 2002; In his address at the Summit, President Sezer reemphasized Turkey's experience in fighting terrorism and the importance of international cooperation in tackling with this issue. President's Press Office, Asya'da Isbirligi ve Güven Artirici Önlemler Konferansi Zirve Toplantisi'nda Yaptiklari Konusma, 4 June 2002.
[62] "Black Sea Economic Cooperation Tackles Energy and Terrorism," Turkish News, 26 June 2002.
[63] "Afghanistan is on agenda again as energy route," Turkish Daily News, 24 May, 2002; for an analysis on the impact of the war on BTC pipeline, see: Cenk Pala, "Afganistan Savasi'nin Hazar Boru Hatti Projelerine Etkisi: 'Kirmizi Kalem' bu Kez Kimin Elinde?," Stratejik Arastirmalar Dosyasi (Vol.3, No.11 2002), pp.17-24.
[64] F. Stephen Larrabee, "Russia and Its Neighbors: Integration or Disintegration," in Richard L. Kugler and Ellen L. Frost, eds., The Global Century, Globalization and National Security, Volume II, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2001, pp. 859-874.
[65] For an analysis of the new developments, see: Elnur Soltan, "Bush-Putin Zirvesi: Soguk Savas'in Ikinci Bitisi," Stratejik Analiz (Vol.2, No.20, December 2001), pp.5-24; However Ozdag notes that rather than a willing consent to U.S. deployment in Central Asia, Russia had to bow to U.S. pressure, see: Ümit Özdag, "Terörizm, Küresel Güvenlik ve Türkiye," Stratejik Analiz (Vol.2, No.19, November 2001), p.8.
[66] For an early warning that Turkey's "bridging role' may shift to Russia, see: Mehmet Binay, Ankara Köprü Rolünü Devrediyor, (Ankara is handing over its bridging role), www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr newsportal, 5 October 2002.
[67] See: Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, "Turkish-Russian Relations a Decade Later: From Adversary to Managed Competition," Perceptions (Vol. 6, No.1, March-May 2001), pp. 79-98
[68] This is justified by referring to a document, called the Eurasia-Action Plan, signed in November 2001 by the foreign ministers of the two countries, see: Karaosmanoglu, op.cit.; In his New Year's address, Foreign Minister Cem was also underlining that Turkey perceived Russia more as a partner than competitor. Disisleri Güncesi, January 2002; likewise, Turkey's reaction to U.S.-Russian rapprochement was positive: "Turkey pleased with US - Russian rapprochement," Turkish Daily News, 29 May 2002; even a change in Russia's attitude towards Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline is also noted. For the evolution of Russian position, see: Sinan Ogan, "Kremlin ve Lukoil Arasinda Rusya'nin Baku-Ceyhan Politikasi," Stratejik Analiz (Vol.3, No.26, June 2002), pp. 68-76.
[69] "Majority Opposes Attack on Afghans," Turkish Daily News, 4 October 2001.
[70] Turkey had already provided the U.S. with overflight rights in September shortly after attacks: "Turkey opens airspace to US," BBC News Online, 22 September, 2001.
[71] see Turkish dailies from 03 October 2001; for different reactions, see "Asker Gönderme Icin ne Demislerdi?" www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr newsportal, 2 November 2001; this initial ambivalence and 'passivism' was however criticized by some analysts, see: Özdag, Terörizm, Küresel Güvenlik, pp.10-11.
[72] "Analysis: Turkey's Pivotal Position," BBC News Online, 18 October 2001.
[73] For the Turkish debate on ISAF, see: Saban Kardas, "Dilemmas of Peacebuilding: Reflections on Turkey's Drive for ISAF Command," Features, Turkish Daily News (19 April 2002).
[74] "Basbakan Sayin Bülent Ecevit'in TBMM'de Yaptiklari Konusma," Disisleri Güncesi, 10 October 2001; also see: "Basbakan Sayin Bülent Ecevit'in CNN International Televizyonu'na Verdikleri Mülakat," Disisleri Güncesi, 12 October 2001.
[75] "Leadership to Test Turkish Military Might," Turkish News, 03 May 2002.
[76] for more on Turkey's motives, see: "Afganistan Politikamizi Ulusal Cikarlarimiz ve Tercihlerimiz Belirliyor," Interview with Huseyin Bagci, 2023, No.7, November 2001, pp.22-27; Mehmet Seyfettin Erol, "Firsatlar ve Zorluklar Ikileminde Türkiye-Afganistan Iliskilerinde Yeni Dönem," Stratejik Analiz, Vol.2, No.23, March 2002, pp.77-85; Alan Makovsky, "Turkey's Unfinished Role in the War on Terrorism," Insight Turkey, Vol.4, No.1, January-March 2002, pp.44-45; Hugh Pope," Turkey's Role in Afghanistan Presents Opportunity," Wall Street Journal, June 6, 2002, p.A16.
[77] "Turkey rattled by conflict fears," BBC News Online: Business, 17 September, 2001.
[78] "Turkey Promises Troops for Afghan Campaign," Insight Turkey, Vol.3, No.4, October-December, 2001, p.180.
[79] "US Delegation Suggests Rethink of Turkey's $5 Billion Military Debt," Turkish News, October 2, 2001.
[80] Fikret Bila, "Ecevit'ten Bush'a: 'Taliban devrilmeli'," Milliyet, 26 September 2001.
[81] See, for instance Prime Minister's address at party group, Hürriyet, 9.11.2001 also for the coverage of Foreign Minister Cem's visit to Kabul on 17 December 2001, in which he made extensive references to historical ties as facilitating factor of cooperation, see Turkish dailies from 18.12.2001.
[82] Paul M. Wihbey and Sule Kilicarslan, "A Turkish Strategic Window of Opportunity," Insight Turkey (October-December 2001, Volume 3, Number 4), p.21.
[83] "Cem: Turkish model is Paradigm of Civilization".
[84] "Powell: Atatürk Afganistan Konusunda Hakliydi," Hürriyet, 06 December 2001.
[85] See, Makovsky, op.cit., pp.42,44.
[86] for a critical account, see, Kardas, op.cit.; also for a careful approach see, Erol, op.cit.
[87] There were even speculations that in the planning and conduct of military campaign in Afghanistan U.S. central command could be situated in Turkey, yet they turned out to be unsubstantiated exaggerations of Turkey's role. Based on this prospect, some analysts even had gone as far as arguing that moving the central command to Turkey could revitalize Turkey's strategic importance and could create a counter-balance against the growing influence of the EU/Germany in Eastern Mediterranean in view of the accession of Cyprus into the EU. "Prof. Dr. Osman Metin Öztürk'le Söylesi," 2023 (No.6, October 2001), pp18-19.
[88] "Bozkir (Vice Secretary-General for European Union Affairs): 'Turkey Can Anticipate a Warmer West," Turkish News, 3 October, 2001.
[89] For an assessment of the effects of the war in Afghanistan on CFSP/ESDP, see: Saban Kardas, "Afganistan Operasyonu'nun AGSP'ye Olan Yansimalari," 25 November 2001, http://www.liberal-dt.org.tr/guncel/Kardas/sk_afganistan.htm.
[90] "Rays of Light: For the First time in a Year, Turks are Seeing Some Flickers of Hope," Economist, December 15, 2001, Vol.361, No.8252.
[91] "No Concessions on ESDI and Cyprus: Ecevit", www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr newsportal, December 7, 2001.
[92] Particularly Colin Powell's visit to Ankara was the indicator of U.S. support: "Powell to push for Cyprus settlement," Turkish Daily News, 3 December 2001; Jim Kapsis, "Beyond geopolitics for Cyprus," The Washington Times, December 5, 2001, for a Turkish view, see: Cengiz Candar, "11 Eylül Jeopolitigi ve Kibris'ta Son Tango," www.haberturk.com newsportal, 06.12.2001.
[93] see for instance the quotation from Economy Minister Dervis, above.
[94] It suffices, in this regard, to remember that during a U.S.-EU summit in May 2002 Turkey was barely on the agenda: "EU-US Summit Starts Today: Turkey's EU Membership is not on the Agenda," Turkish Daily News, 3 May 2002.
[95] Tuncer Kilinc, Secretary-General of the National Security Council, who, with his statement on March 7, 2002, shocked observers and stimulated an intensive discussion by maintaining that Turkey would never be accepted by the EU, hence it should rather seek alternative allies. "Turkey Will Never be Accepted by the EU: Kilinc," www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr news portal (March 7, 2002); Ihsan Dagi, "Kritik Karar: ABD ya da AB," Radikal, 12 March 2002; Ihsan Dagi, "Competing Strategies for Turkey: Eurasianism or Europeanism?", Central Asia and Caucasus Analyst (SAIS Biweekly Briefing, Wednesday, May 8, 2002); M.Ali Birand, "Will Turkey Choose the EU or the USA?," Turkish Daily News, (Opinion: 19 April 2002) .
[96] "Türkiye'yi Kaybederiz," Milliyet, 22 October 2001.
[97] ESDI is completed from our point of view: Cem," www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr newsportal, December 13, 2001.
[98] U.S. Department of State, "Grossman: Change in the Value of Enduring Alliances"; "Turkey Called the 'shining crown jewel' amid unstability: US Team Hails Turkey for its Important Role," Turkish Daily News, 2 October 2001; U.S; Ambassador to Turkey was also underlining that the U.S. could have no better ally than Turkey in the war on terrorism, see: Robert W. Pearson, "The United States and Turkey: A Model of Sustained Engagement," The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Winter-Spring 2002, pp.53-62; Annie Pforzheimer, "The United States and Turkey: A Post-September 11 Model of Sustained Engagement," Polis Bilimleri Dergisi, Vol.4, No.1-2, January-June 2002, pp.1-8.
[99] Steven A. Cook, "US-Turkey relations and the war on terrorism," Insight Turkey, Vol.3, No.4, October-December 2001, pp.37-48.
[100] "Ismail Cem's New Year's address," Disisleri Güncesi, January 2002.
[101] "Ecevit's Washington Visit Highlights Turkey's Increased Value," Turkish Daily News, 15 January 2002; "Turkish-US Relations," Newspot, No.31, January-February 2002; Disisleri Güncesi, January 2002.
[102] "The Target is More Trade with America: Ecevit," www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr newsportal, January 14, 2002.
[103] For this and other reactions, see: Elif Ünal, "PM Ecevit Earns High Marks with U.S. Visit," Turkish Probe, 20 January, 2002, No.470.
[104] "U.S. Ready to Discuss Turkish Trade," Associated Press, January 17, 2002.
[105] "Turkish-US Commission Meets over Heavy Agenda," Turkish Daily News, 27 February, 2002.
[106] "Türkiye, ABD-İsrail anlaşmasına katılacak," www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr newsportal, February 27, 2002; "Hopes Dim after First Round of Turkey-US Economic Partnership Commission," Turkish Probe, No.475, 3 March 2002; The Chairman of Turkish-US Business Council, Akin Öngör, was critical of the conclusions of the meeting: "ABD Türkiye'yi Ihmal Ederse Uyuyamaz", Hürriyet, 17 March 2002; "US leaves out several sectors from Turkish QIZs," Turkish Daily News, 27 June 2002.
[107] Although there was optimism that most of the Congressional opposition to Turkey would dimish, on certain issues it did in fact persist: "Inan: Armenian Lobby has no Chance against Turkey," Turkish Daily News, 8 May 2002; compare: "Obstacle From the Greek Lobby to Helicopter Purchase," Turkish Daily News, 12 June 2002.
[108] "Turkish Ambassador to US Speaks at Fletcher," March 14, 2002, http://www.tacsne.org/Past%20Activities/Fletcherhaber.htm.
[109] Cengiz Candar, "'Stratejik' degil 'aday ortak'...," Yeni Safak, 22 January 2002.
[110] Kemal Balci, "US Ties Turkish Government's Hands," Turkish Probe, 20 January, 2002, No.470.
[111] "Kriz, OECD liginde küme düsürdü" www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr newsportal, 19 May 2002; Bülent Aliriza, "Turkey and the Global Storm," Insight Turkey, Vol.3, No.4, October-December 2001, p.25.
[112] "Congressman Wexler: US Must Throw all Support behind Turkey," Turkish Daily News, 21 February 2002.
[113] on this famous analogy, see two contributions to Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol.1, No.1, Spring 2002: Cem Akyürek, "Argentina's Experience: Any Lessons for Turkey?"; Ümit Kumcuoglu, "Turkey vs. Argentina: A Comparative Analysis with a Long Term Perspective"; also see: Murat Ücer, "When You Cry for Argentina, Should You Cry for Turkey too?," Private View, Summer 2001, No.1, pp.56-59.
[114] Indeed, although Dervis' negotiations with IMF at the end of September 2001 did not bear fruits, by mid-November the IMF announced the release of further US$ 11 billion loans. In the meantime, Dervis visited Vice President Cheney and brought his case directly to him. It seems, the U.S. influence paid off. See, Aliriza, op.cit., p.33.
[115] "ABD Türkiye'yi Ihmal Ederse Uyuyamaz," Hürriyet, 17 March 2002.
[116] Aliriza, op.cit., p.33.
[117]"Yabanci Hala Inat Ediyor," Radikal, 29 April 2002.
[118] "Turkey Overhauling Foreign Investment Procedures," Turkish Probe, No.487, 26 May 2002.
[119] "Türkiye'nin 70 Milyar Dolari Disarda," www.haberturk.com newsportal, 15 November 2001.
[120] "ABD'li yorumcu: IMF Türkiye'yi satın aldi," www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr newsportal, 2 April 2002.
[121] Daniel N. Nelson, "The Dependent Alliance," Insight Turkey, Vol.4, No.1, January-March 2002, p.62.
[122] "Turkey Wants Assurances before Taking ISAF Command," Turkish Daily News, 27 February 2002.
[123] Elif Ünal, "Playing 'World power' Role may Cost Turkey," Turkish Daily News, 3 March 2002.
[124] "Türkiye ISAF Liderliginden Vazgecebilir," www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr newsportal, 11 March 2002.
[125] "Türkiye'nin ISAF Faturasini ABD Ödeyecek," Hürriyet, 18 March 2002; "Turkey to Take over Afghan Mission," Associated Press, 29 April 2002; however, the U.S. aid was also delayed due to Congressional approval, "Turkish Troops in Afghanistan, US Aid is Delayed," Turkish Daily News, 12 June 2002.
[126] "AWACS Negotiations Complete," Turkish Daily News, 5 June 2002.
[127]"Cem: Turkish Model is Paradigm of Civilization".
[128] Wihbey and Kilicarslan, op.cit., pp.22-23.